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Introduction
The increased likelihood of disasters linked to climate change, such as floodings, droughts, and forest fires, has put greenhouse gas reduction targets on policy agendas worldwide.
The European Union (EU) acknowledged the importance of this endeavor by committing itself to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent until 2020 compared to 1990
figures. In 2005, the EU introduced the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a multinational cap-and-trade system, in order to regulate emissions from stationary industrial installations. The need for effective and efficient policy instruments to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions requires a thorough ex post evaluation of existing policies. The analysis of the EU ETS and its impact on regulated firms offers the opportunity to better understand the mechanisms and consequences of market based policy instruments.
First studies investigating the causal effects of the EU ETS show that it significantly reduced carbon dioxide emissions of regulated firms in many countries and spurred the development of new low carbon technologies throughout Europe (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Muûls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen, 2016; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016) . Despite its positive short and long term effects, the EU ETS has been the subject of significant political debate due to its potential adverse impact on the economic performance and competitiveness of regulated fims that compete on global markets.
From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear whether the EU ETS has an overall negative effect on the economic performance of regulated firms. The cost of complying with the EU ETS might decrease revenues and profits. However, according to the induced innovation hypothesis postulated by Hicks (1932) , a relative change in input prices might create incentives to invest in new technology in order to reduce the use of the increasingly expensive input. In which way these adjustments affect economic performance depends on the production technolgy, input and output markets, and other factors that differ across firms. Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) put forward a stronger hypothesis specificly addressing the effects of environmental policy. They argue that properly designed regulation might not only increase the incentives to develop and adopt environmentally friendly technology but also consequently might affect competitiveness in a favorable manner. Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) empirically investigate the induced innovation hypothesis and show that the EU ETS has a positive causal impact on low carbon innovation measured by patenting activities. These inventions, but also operational changes or investments in existing more efficient technologies might increase economic performance and create an advantage for regulated firms over competitors.
The aim of this study is to analyze the causal effect of the EU ETS on the economic performance of regulated firms. First, I estimate a structural production function model in order to obtain the total factor productivity as a robust and comprehensive measure of economic performance. Secondly, I isolate and quantify the effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms by exploiting treatment variation that results from the design of the scheme.
The dispersion in productivity levels across firms and plants has been under investigation in many areas of economic research, such as industrial organization, labor, and trade (Syverson, 2011) . Internal factors, such as input quality (Van Biesebroeck, 2003) , managerial practice (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) , or R&D activity (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) ), but also external factors, such as trade competition (De Loecker, 2007) or market regulation (Knittel, 2002) drive firm-level productivity. 1 Furthermore, market based environmental regulation has been identified as a driver of firm-level productivity. Greenstone, List, and Syverson (2012) investigate the impact of air quality regulation on the productivity of U.S. plants. Regulations governing ozone, particulates, and sulfor dioxide decreased productivity, while regulations limiting carbon monoxide increased productivity. On average, the productivity of polluting plants decreased by 4.8 percent in regulated areas. Commins, Lyons, Schiffbauer, and Tol (2011) investigate the correlation between energy taxation and productivity during the period from 1997 to 2007. They use balance sheet data of European firms from the sectors manufacturing, energy, and transport. Exploiting industry level variation in energy taxation, they find a positive correlation between taxation and firm-level productivity. In addition, they report a negative correlation between EU ETS participation and productivity for the first compliance period.
The origins of production function estimation date far back in economic literature. Marschak and Andrews (1944) investigate the challenges of estimating production functions using OLS. The observed input factors that enter the production function are chosen by firms. Therefore, unobserved firm specific determinants of production that are correlated with the choice of inputs are likely to bias OLS estimates. Recent advances have been made by Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) who develop a structural econometric model of production that corrects for the described simultaneity bias using investments to proxy unobserved firm specific productivity shocks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) show that also static inputs can be used as proxies in the framework of the control function approach. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) (henceforth ACF) build on the basic idea to use observed firm characteristics to proxy the unobserved productivity, but suggest a more general and more robust estimation procedure. De Loecker (2013) enhances the ACF model by allowing for an endogenous productivity process.
The empirical strategy of this paper consists of two steps. First, I follow ACF and De Loecker (2013) and estimate a robust production function that allows the EU ETS to simultaneously influence input choice and productivity process in order to obtain an estimate for firm-level productivity. Secondly, I employ an identification strategy that relies on treatment variation caused by the design of the EU ETS in order to estimate the average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms. In order to balance administrative cost, the EU exempts small and medium sized emitters from 1 See Syverson (2011) for a comprehensive survey on the productivity dispersion literature.
regulation by the EU ETS. As a consequence, there are regulated and unregulated firms within narrowly defined industries. I exploit this variation by estimating a variety of difference-in-differences models that isolate the effect of the EU ETS from confounding factors.
The empirical analysis is based on administrative firm data from Germany. I observe detailed annual firm-level information for the period from 1999 to 2012. The core of the dataset is the Cost Structure Survey (henceforth CSS) carried out by the German statistical offices. The CSS contains comprehensive annual information on output produced and inputs used by firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. It is the foundation of many governmental statistics and reports on the activities of the manufacturing sector.
The average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms is statistically significant and ranges between 0.5 and 0.7 percent during the first compliance period depending on the set of control variables. The estimated treatment effect for the second compliance period is negative, but economically and statistically insignificant. Moreover, annual average treatment effects support the finding that the EU ETS had an impact during the first compliance period, while the estimated effects are not significantly different from zero for years of the second compliance period. In order to investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment effect across industries, I additionally estimate the difference-in-differences model for energy intensive two-digit industries with a sufficient number of regulated firms. The effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of firms from the food, paper, and chemical industry are not significantly different from zero. When estimating the model based on data for the industry producing basic metals, I find a significant positive effect for the first compliance period ranging between 2.4 and 2.9 percent.
In order to relax the parametric assumption of the difference-in-differences model, I follow Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012) and combine the difference-in-differences framework with nonparametric nearest neighbor matching. The estimated treatment effects are statistically significant and positive for the first compliance period. In contrast to the parametric approach, the difference-in-differences matching model also provides evidence for a positive effect of the EU ETS during the second compliance period. The estimated treatment effects are slightly higher in comparison to the parametric approach and range between 1.5 and 2.7 percent for the first compliance period and 1.2 and 1.4 percent for the second compliance period, respectively. Annual treatment effect estimates based on the difference-in-differences matching model support the result that the EU ETS had a stronger effect during the first compliance period. For all models and specifications, I investigate pretreatment years and show that the productivity evolves in a parallel fashion across groups.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the regulatory framework of the EU ETS and gives an overview of the empirical literature concerned with the causal effects of the EU ETS on firms' production and investment decisions. Section 3 describes the underlying official firm data and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the empirical production function estimation and the difference-in-differences model employed to identify the causal effect of the EU ETS. Section 5 contains the parameter estimates of the empirical production functions and reports the results of the difference-in-differences model. Section 6 provides robustness checks with regard to heterogeneous treatment effects and functional assumptions. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
The EU ETS as a natural experiment
In the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU committed itself to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent until 2020 compared with 1990 levels. In order to achieve its emission targets, the EU decided in 2003 to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from industrial installations by building an EU wide emissions trading system (European Parliament and Council, 2003) . The resulting EU ETS was finally introduced in 2005
and currently regulates about 45 percent of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions caused by more than 11,000 installations in 31 countries. 2
The EU ETS covers emissions from combustion installations and installations that run energy intensive production processes, such as oil refining, the production of metals, cement, lime, ceramics, bricks, glass, or paper. The design of the EU ETS excludes small and medium sized installations. For each of the listed processes, the European Commission (EC) defined specific capacity thresholds that determine the inclusion into the EU ETS. A few very recent studies aim to contribute empirical evidence to the academic and public debates by investigating the causal effects of the EU ETS on the emissions and the economic performance of regulated firms. These studies exploit treatment variation that results from the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS. Since only large emitters are regulated, there are regulated and unregulated firms within narrowly defined industries that can be compared. The empirical evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on firm-level emissions and emission intensity is mixed. Studies using data from Germany, France, and Norway suggest that the EU ETS significantly reduced greenhouse gas emission (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Muûls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen (2016) The existing ex post evaluations investigate the effect of the EU ETS on revenues, value added, and labor productivity. These indicators do not provide a comprehensive picture of the firm specific economic performance. I employ a structural production function model in order to obtain a robust estimate of the firm-level total factor productivity. This measure for economic performance has been prominently used in the economic literature to investigate the origins of productivity dispersion.
Following the literature on the ex post evaluation of the EU ETS, I exploit the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS to develop a sound identification strategy. I compare the firm specific productivity of firms that are regulated, i.e. belong to the treatment group, with the productivity of firms that are unregulated, i.e. belong to the control group, before and after the implementation of the EU ETS. I estimate the treatment effect employing parametric and nonparametric difference-in-differences models.
Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis consists of two subsequent steps. 7 First, I estimate a robust production function that allows for an endogenous productivity process. It corrects for simultaneous changes in productivity and input use after a firm is regulated by the EU ETS. The resulting production function is used to recover a firm specific measure of productivity. Secondly, I assess the causal effect of the EU ETS on firm-level productivity by employing the difference-in-differences framework.
6 The Federation of German Industries is an umbrella association representing the interests of more than 100,000 firms with about eight million employees. 7 I follow the procedure applied by Braguinsky, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson (2015) and employ a two-step approach in order to investigate the effect of the EU ETS on firm specific productivity changes.
This procedure enables me to control for a large set of confounding factor in a difference-in-differences framework.
Production function estimation
Since the seminal paper of Marschak and Andrews (1944) , it has been known that the estimation of a production function using OLS most likely leads to biased coefficients.
The observed input factors that enter the production function -here, capital and labor -are chosen by the firm. If there is a firm specific determinant of production, that influences the input choice and is only visible to the firm itself, the OLS estimates will be biased.
OP develop a structural econometric model of production that corrects for the described simultaneity bias by using investments to proxy unobserved firm specific productivity shocks. LP enhance this approach and show that also static inputs, such as materials or energy use, can be used as proxy variables to control for productivity. 8 ACF build on the basic idea that underlies OP and LP, namely using observed firm characteristics to proxy the unobserved productivity, but suggest a more general and more robust estimation procedure. I estimate the production function following the approach proposed by ACF.
I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function that takes the following empirical log linear form for firm i at time t:
where y it is the logarithm of gross value added, k it and l it denote the observable inputs capital and labor expressed in logs, and ω it is the unobservable Hicks neutral productivity term. The error term ε it accounts for random shocks and measurement error and is assumed to be identically and independently distributed.
I assume, that the capital stock k at time t is determined by the investment i and the capital stock depreciation in t − 1. The labor market regulation is quite strict in
Germany by granting employees a period of notice that can last several months depending on employment relationship and industry. Therefore, I also treat labor as a dynamic input and assume that it is chosen between t − 1 and t. OP, LP, and ACF assume the dynamics of productivity to evolve according to an exogenous first order Markov process. I follow De Loecker (2013) and consider a more general model, where I allow determinants of production to influence future productivity. 9 Accordingly, the evolution 8 Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) offer a more detailed technical description of the differences between these approaches. 9 De Loecker (2013) includes exports into the first order Markov process in order to investigate the learning by exporting hypothesis. The idea to allow for endogenous productivity has been implemented in several structural econometric production models. Criscuolo and Martin (2009) steel industry. Braguinski, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson (2015) investigate the effect of merger on productivity. All these studies feature the inclusion of additional production determinants into the first order Markov process that governs the productivity dynamics.
of the productivity dynamics is described by
where the vector z collects determinants of production. The EU ETS might influence the production and investment decisions of a regulated firm and thus affect future productivity. Therefore, the effect of the EU ETS on productivity dynamics should be taken into account in order to prevent potential bias. I include a dummy variable indicating if a firm is regulated at time t. Furthermore, I add dummies for exports and R&D, since it has already been shown by De Loecker (2013), Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) , and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011) that both factors are important drivers of productivity.
Accordingly, the functional relationship between ω it and the determinants of production is governed by
where ets it , rnd it , and exp it denote dummy variables, that indicate if a firm is regulated by the EU ETS, invests in R&D, or exports, respectively.
In order to deal with correlation between the observed inputs and productivity, I
follow LP and rely on a firm's use of intermediate inputs m to control for unobserved productivity shocks that are captured by ω it . I assume, that a firm's demand for the intermediate input is given by
I assume monotonicity of intermediate inputs in productivity and thus invert g t (·) to obtain ω it = h t (k it , l it , m it , z it ), the proxy for productivity in the empirical production function, i.e.
The parameters β k and β l are not identified in this equation, since they are both included in h t (·). Following ACF, I non-parametrically estimate this equation to obtain the
As shown in Equation (6), the disposal of ε it enables me to compute the productivity for any possible combination of β k and β l :
As in the ACF approach, I plug ω it (β k , β l ) into the law of motion of productivity in Equation (2) in order to obtain the error term given β k and β l , ξ it (β k , β l ). The consequent moment conditions I employ to identify the parameters of the production function are described by
As explained above, I assume both capital and labor to be dynamic inputs and thus to be mean independent of ξ it . I employ the generalized method of moments to estimate the parameters. Finally, I use the estimates for β k and β l to recover the implied productivity:
Disentangling the effect of the EU ETS
The second step of my empirical analysis is to identify and quantify the causal effect of the EU ETS by comparing changes in productivity across German manufacturing firms that are differentially affected by the EU ETS. Due to the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS, there are regulated and unregulated firms within narrowly defined industries allowing for a natural experiment framework. The baseline specification of the employed difference-in-differences model I estimate for the time period from 1999 to 2012 is
where ET S i indicates if a firm is regulated by the EU ETS, P haseI t is equal to one for years during the first compliance period (2005) (2006) (2007) and zero otherwise, and P haseII t The inclusion of industry fixed effects ϕ s adjusts for all constant unobserved determinants of productivity across industries. The year fixed effects δ t control for superior trends in productivity in German manufacturing. λ st denotes the full interaction terms between the industry and year fixed effects and nonparametrically absorbs within industry productivity trends. The error term u it is assumed to be mean zero.
The parameters α 2 and α 3 on the interaction terms between ET S i and the indicators for the two compliance periods P haseI t and P haseII t are the estimated effect of the EU ETS during Phase I and Phase II, respectively. In order to take into account observed and unobserved heterogeneity across regulated and unregulated firms, I enhance the baseline specification (Specification I) gradually. First, I add additional control variables, namely capital stock, employment, energy use, and material use (Specification II). Then, I add lagged indicators for export and R&D experience (Specification III) and firm fixed effects that adjust for all constant unobserved determinants of productivity across firms (Specification IV).
Key to the described identification strategy is the parallel trend assumption: I assume that in the absence of regulation by the EU ETS, trends in productivity evolve in a parallel fashion across groups conditional on the included control variables. In order to motivate this assumption, I investigate the development of productivity across treatment and control groups during pretreatment years. In particular, I estimate the following difference-in-differences model for the years before the announcement of the EU ETS,
i.e. the period between 1999 and 2002:
where I(t > 2000) equals one for the years 2001 and 2002. Therefore, the parameter α 2 is a placebo treatment effect. The parallel trend assumption would be violated, if α 2 is significantly different from zero. I apply this procedure to all aforementioned specifications of the difference-in-differences model.
The model described in Equation 9
provides the average treatment effects of the EU ETS on firm specific productivity for the first and the second compliance period. Within the two compliance periods, there was a high variation in the EUA price. High prices might have provoked stronger reactions by regulated firms and thus might have caused a heterogeneous treatment effect over time. In order to examine, if the effect of the EU ETS on productivity changes over time within the compliance periods, I estimate a modified difference-in-differences model that provides annual treatment effects: 
Data and preliminary analysis
This study is based on official firm data from Germany. Combining different administrative data sources, I observe detailed annual firm-level information on general characteristics, cost structure, energy use, and EU ETS obligations for the time period from 1999 to 2012.
The core of the dataset is the Cost Structure Survey (CSS) carried out by the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States. The CSS contains comprehensive annual information on output produced and inputs employed by firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. The CSS includes all German manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees. For firms with at least 20 and less than 500 employees, the statistical offices collect data from a large random sample. 10 The participation in the CSS is mandatory by law and results are checked for consistency and verified by the statistical offices. It is the foundation for many governmental statistics and reports on the activities of the manufacturing sector.
10 Similar data sets from other countries have been used in the productivity dispersion literature. Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) for example employ the Spanish equivalent in order to examine the effect of R&D on firm-level productivity
The random sample of firms with more than 20 and less than 500 employees is renewed once every few years -in the sample period at hand, the random sample has been drawn in 1999, 2003, 2008, and 2012 . The random sample is stratified by the number of employees and industry affiliation. Firms with more than 20 and less than 500 employees are always surveyed if they belong to concentrated industries.
In order to add information on employment, exports, investments, and entry and exit The measure for output is the firm's gross value added which is obtained from the CSS and deflated using two-digit ISIC deflators. 12 The labor input is constructed by taking the annual average of the number of employees reported monthly in the production census. The annual average offers a more detailed view on employment in comparison to the number of employees collected at the reporting date of the CSS. I use detailed investment data contained in the production census in order to compute the capital stock for each firm based on the perpetual inventory method. 13 The material expenditures stem from the CSS and are deflated by type using deflators for the manufacturing sector. 14 In addition, the firms participating in the CSS are asked to report R&D expenditures.
These comprise the cost of internal R&D activities, but also joint activities with external research centers and laboratories. I consider a firm to conduct R&D activities, if the total R&D expenditures are positive. The production census provides export revenues on the firm-level. Analogously I consider a firm to be exporting if it reports positive export revenues.
In Table 1 , I report descriptive statistics to characterize the group of firms regulated by the EU ETS and the group of unregulated firms. Firms regulated by the EU ETS are on average larger in terms of output produced and inputs used. This is due to the design of the EU ETS that only regulates large emitters. There is a relatively high number of small and medium sized firms in the data set. Therefore, statistics on the control group and the entire data set show positively skewed distributions on the main characteristics. 15 On average, the firms of the manufacturing sector were expanding 11 See Annex A for more information on the merge of CSS, AFiD, and EUTL. 12 The data on price indices can be retrieved from the web portal of the Federal Statistical Office:
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online Producer Price Index 61241-0004. 13 This procedure has been used by many other papers estimating production functions, as for instance Olley and Pakes (1996) . See Annex B for details on the computation of the capital stock. 14 See footnote 11. to 2012, the firms rapidly recovered and continued to grow on average. Table 2 shows the distribution of regulated and unregulated firms across two-digit industries in the merged data set. While combustion installations that generate heat or power can be found in most industries, the firms that operate process regulated installations are mainly concentrated in the industries manufacturing food (10), beverages (11), paper (17), coke and refined petroleum products (19), chemicals (20), pharmaceutical products (21), rubber and plastic (22), other nonmetallic mineral products (23), and basic metals (24).
higher moments of the distributions. 
Results
In this section, I first report the production function estimates based on the ACF approach I described in Section 3.1. Secondly, I will show the results of the difference-indifferences model I outlined in Section 3.2 in order to shed light onto the causal effect of the EU ETS on firm-level productivity.
Production function estimates
I estimate value added production functions for two-digit industries within manufacturing using data for the time period from 1999 to 2012. Table 3 reports the results of the ACF model along with estimates based on standard OLS regressions, the total number of firms and the total number of observations for the entire sample period. This development is also reflected in a drop in productivity of most two-digit industries.
Firms cannot smoothly adapt their input choice to demand shocks. Therefore, a rapid decline in demand decreases capacity utilization and consequently productivity. (2015) . More information on the bootstrap can be found in Horowitz (2001) in-differences model always include industry and year fixed effects as well as a full set of interaction terms. In this way, the model nonparametrically captures heterogeneous developments in productivity across industries and over time. Table 4 reports the results of the difference-in-differences model described in Section 3.2.
Estimated treatment effects
The first column shows the estimates of Specification I that includes fixed effects and full interaction terms on industry and year. Columns two and three report the results for Specification II and Specification III that include an enhanced set of control variables.
The results of Specification IV that adds firm fixed effects are shown in the last column.
The displayed treatment effects can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. 6 Robustness checks
Heterogeneous treatment effects
The industries within the manufacturing sector differ with regard to many aspects.
They produce very different goods, face different market conditions on input and output markets and face different kinds of regulation. As a consequence, the effect of the EU ETS on the regulated firms might vary across industries. The average treatment effect over all industries therefore does not provide the full picture of the impact of the EU ETS.
For this reason, I analyze the effect of the EU ETS at the two-digit industry level.
I focus on the industries manufacturing food products (10), paper and paper products (17), chemicals and chemical products (20), rubber and plastic products (22), other nonmetallic mineral products (23) as well as basic metals (24). These industries provide a sufficient number of observations in the group of the regulated firms (see Table 2 ). I estimate the difference-in-differences model depicted in Equation 9 and further investigate the validity of the parallel trend assumption by estimating a placebo treatment effect during the pretreatment period from 1999 to 2002 as described by Equation 10. The standard errors are again obtained by applying the block bootstrap algorithm. Table 5 reports the results for Specification I and II and Table 6 shows the results for Specification III and IV, respectively. Considering the first compliance period, the estimated treatment effects for the industries manufacturing food (10), paper (17), and chemicals (20) are mostly positive, but statistically insignificant. During the second compliance period, the effect of the EU ETS was statistically insignificant, but the signs varied across the three industries. The estimated treatment effect was positive for the industries producing food (10) and chemicals (20), while the effect was negative for the paper industry (17). The results for the industries producing rubber and plastic (22) and other nonmetallic mineral products (23) indicate that the parallel trend assumption is violated for some specifications. Therefore, I refrain from interpreting the results for these industries. The EU ETS had a significant positive effect on the firms of the industry producing basic metals (24) during the first compliance period. The effect ranges between 2.4 and 2.9 percent. During the second compliance period, the EU ETS did not significantly influence the productivity of the regulated firms. For this industry, the pretreatment analysis supports the parallel trend assumption.
The subsample analysis sheds light on the heterogeneity of the treatment effect, however, this empirical strategy comes along with a reduction of the sample size. The number of firms ranges from 1,707 (paper industry, 17) to 4,342 (food industry, 10) in the period from 1999 to 2012, while the total number of observation ranges from 10,310
(paper industry, 17) to 22,981 (food industry, 10). As a consequence, the precision of the estimates decreases in comparison to the analysis using the full sample.
The results of the subsample analysis support the hypothesis that the effect of the EU ETS is not homogeneous across industries. 
Relaxing functional form assumptions
The parametric difference-in-differences model described in Section 3.2 relies on functional form assumptions on the treatment and outcome model that might affect the estimated treatment effect. When including observable firm characteristics into the difference-in-differences model, I implicitly assume a linear relationship between the control variables, the treatment, and the outcome. In order to relax this assumption, I follow Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012) and combine the difference-in-differences framework with nonparametric nearest neighbor matching. Based on the firm characteristics I observe, I match treated firms with similar untreated firms. The resulting control group only contains firms that are similar to the firms of the treatment group.
Following Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) the difference-in-difference matching estimator is described bŷ
The set of firms regulated by the EU ETS is defined as I 1 , while the unregulated firms The results of the difference-in-differences nearest neighbor matching approach support the results of the parametric difference-in-differences model. 
Concluding discussion
Debates on potential detrimental effects of emissions trading on economic performance have accompanied the first two compliance periods of the EU ETS. This paper investigated the causal effect of the EU ETS on the total factor productivity of regulated firms.
The productivity is measured as residual from a structural production function estimate that is robust with regard to endogeneity and allows the EU ETS to simultaneously influence input choice and the dynamic productivity process. I identify the effect of the EU ETS on firm-level productivity by exploiting treatment variation that occurs due to the design of the EU ETS. In order to releave small and medium sized emitters of carbon dioxide from the regulatory burden, only large emitters have been included into the EU ETS. I examine changes in the firm-level productivity by comparing regulated and unregulated firms before and after the implementation of the EU ETS. In particular, I
estimate a variety of parametric difference-in-differences models including different sets of explanatory variables and fixed effects in order to eliminate the influence of potential confounding factors.
The estimated treatment effects for the first compliance period of the EU ETS are mostly statistically significant and positive. No effect of the EU ETS could be observed for the second compliance period using the parametric difference-in-differences model.
Estimated treatment effects based on a combination of the difference-in-differences framework and nearest neighbor matching support the findings for the first compliance period, but also show a significant positive effect of the EU ETS on productivity during the sec-ond compliance period.
So far, there is no scientific study investigating the effect of the EU ETS on the total factor productivity of regulated firms. The very recent ex post evaluations of the EU ETS mostly find a significant reduction of carbon dioxide emissions (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Muûls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen, 2016) and emission intensity (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Jaraitė and Di Maria, 2016) There are several factors that might have influenced the analysis and should be kept in mind when discussing the results and their implications. First, I would like to point to the fact that the productivity measure employed in this study is revenue based. I use specific two-digit price indicators to deflate outputs produced and inputs employed, however there might be still changes driven by price developments. This has implications for the interpretation of the causal effect of the EU ETS. If firms are able to pass additional cost on to customers, then the higher output price due to a cost pass through could be reflected as a productivity gain. As shown by Bushnell, Chong, and Mansur (2012) and Fabra and Reguant (2014) , emissions costs are passed through to electricity prices by utilities. It is likely that at least in some industries of the manufacturing sector firms are also able to pass through costs to product prices. A solution to this problem would be to estimate a quantity based productivity measure based on physical units of inputs and outputs. The estimation of a quantity based production function for multi-product firms is in general feasible (De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, 2016) . However, this approach requires a sufficient number of single-product firms within narrowly defined industries. Using only German data, I
do not observe enough single-product firms in order to estimate such a model.
A further issue that might influence the results of my analysis is the exit of firms caused by the EU ETS. If the EU ETS forced unproductive regulated firms out of the market, then the average productivity would increase in the group of the regulated firms even if the active firms remained on the same productivity level. Regrettably, the CSS is an unbalanced panel similar to the data sets used in many other studies of the productivity dispersion literature, such as Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) . The design of the CSS impedes a clear distinction between the exit from the market and the end of the obligation to participate in the survey. However, examining the EUTL data I do not observe significant attrition among the EU ETS regulated firms.
The second compliance period of the EU ETS coincides with the world economic crisis. In 2009, output produced and inputs employed decreased in the German manufacturing sector. Firms recovered quickly in the subsequent years, however consequences of the crisis might conflate with the effect of the EU ETS during the second compliance period. I assume that the crisis did not affect firms from the treatment and control group differently conditional on fixed effects and firm characteristics. Among other control variables, I include capital stock, employment, energy use, and material use into the difference-in-differences model in order to capture the variation caused by the crisis.
In this study, I focus on the direct effect of the EU ETS. I abstract from any indirect effects, e.g. through equilibrium effects or the increase of electricity prices due to the EU ETS.
Future research could tackle some of these issues. For example, one could investigate the effects of the EU ETS on industry dynamics by employing structural approaches to ideally European firm-level data.
8 Acknowledgements Figure 4 shows the price series of the ICE-ECX EUA front year futures with the closest maturity. 01-Jan-05 01-Jan-06 01-Jan-07 01-Jan-08 01-Jan-09 01-Jan-10 01-Jan-11 01-Jan-12 01-Jan-13
Notes: Source: ICE-ECX -access via Thomson Reuters Datastream.
A.2. Free allocation and verified emissions
Appendix A.2. provides information on the free allocation and the verified emissions of firms in the dataset. Table 8 shows the total amount of grandfathered EUAs and the total amount of verified emissions for two digit industries. 
A.3. Matching AFiD, CSS, and EUTL
The different internal data sets of the Statistical Offices Germany, such as AFiD and CSS, can be easily merged via plant and firm-level indentifiers. However, it requires some effort to match external data to AFiD and CSS, since the information on firm identifiers and names is not accessible for researchers. I match AFiD data on the firm-level with aggregated data from the EUTL for the years from 2005 to 2012 using the commercial register number and the VAT number. I am able to match 77 percent (813 firms) of the firms in the EUTL with AFiD. The 238 firms that are not matched mainly belong to the energy, public, or service sector and thus are not contained in the production census for manufacturing.
A.4. Descriptive statistics -full sample Table 9 reports additional descriptive statistics on the full sample. 2012. Otherwise it would be problematic to compute the initial capital stock. The growth rate of capital g and the depreciation rate δ can either be assumed to take a certain value or it can be estimated for each industry based on aggregate data. I follow the latter approach and use aggregated data on the two-digit industry level and compute industry specific average growth rates and depreciation rates.
In order to estimate the capital stock I use the firm-level investment data from the AFiD-Panel Industrial Units comprising investment in machinery and equipment, investment in buildings, and investment in properts without buildings. I deflate the investments using two-digit industry level deflators for machinery and equipment as well as general deflators for buildings and property without buildings. Starting from K 1 I plug the firm specific investments and the industry specific time-varying depreciation rates into equation 13 in order to compute the entire time series of the firm's capital stock.
Apart from the AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, I exploit aggregate data on the twodigit industry level. These aggregate data can be retrieved via the Destatis portal GENESIS. 17 In particular I used the tables 81000-0107 National Accounts Depreciation, 81000-0115 Gross Investment, 81000-0116 Gross Capital Stock, 81000-0117 Net Capital Stock, and 61262-0001 Price Index Property in order to compute the growth rates, the depreciation rates and the deflators.
Since the focus of this study lies on the firm-level, I compute the capital stocks for firms. The method can be also employed to estimate capital stocks on the plant level. 
